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Figure S1. Schematic of Charity Task. Related to Figure 1, Task Performance Accuracy, and 
STAR Methods.  
Participants and Agents performed a charitable giving task in which they decided whether to give 
money to one of three charities (donate), or take it for themselves (take). On each trial, the 
participant (or Agent) was shown a picture of one of three charities on one side of the screen, with 
“$10” displayed underneath it, and the word “you” displayed on the other side of the screen, with 
a dollar amount (ranging from $7-$13) displayed underneath it. The participant then made a choice 
(donate or take). The computer program had two modes (or contexts), “normal” and “reversal”. In 
“normal” mode, the program intervened and reversed the participants’ choices on 36% of trials 
(leaving them unaltered on 64% of trials). In “reversal” mode the opposite was true, the program 
reversed the participants’ choices on 64% of trials (leaving choices unaltered on 36% of trials). 
Therefore, to obtain their desired outcomes most of the time, participants would have to reverse 
their decisions (i.e. choose what they didn’t want) when the program was in “reversal” mode. 
Importantly, participants were not explicitly aware of the current program mode (except during 
practice; see below), and instead needed to track it by observing how often the computer was 
reversing their decisions. Participants were instructed that the mode was “stable across multiple 
trials” (in actuality 3-12 trials; see Agent data creation below for details), giving them time to 
learn, and that every so often it would change.  Following the participant’s choice, the computer’s 
action was displayed (a blue straight arrow indicated that the choice happened as intended, a yellow 
curved arrow indicated that the choice had been reversed), and non-chosen dollar amount was 
removed from the screen.  Finally, the participant answered 2 follow-up questions: “Was this the 
outcome you wanted?” (select thumbs up icon for “yes”, thumbs down icon for “no”) and “what 
do you think is the mode now?” Answers were given in the form of 4-alternative-forced-choice 
across icons representing “Definitely Reversal”, “Maybe Reversal”, “Maybe Normal”, “Definitely 
Normal”. Presentation of all screens was self-paced. The three charities (The Southeast Alaska 
Conservation Council, Canine Assistants, Pasadena Humane Society and SPCA) were selected 
based on a previous charitable giving experiment[S1] which found that they were equally preferred 
by individuals with ASD and matched controls. To facilitate understanding of the mode structure, 
participants completed a series of practice trials (21-25) in which they were explicitly told the 
program mode (“normal” or “reversal”) via the display of a mode-specific icon.   
 
Figure S2. Equations for Theory of Mind models. Related to Figures 3, 4, and STAR 
Methods.  
Bt and It are the Mentalizer’s probabilistic estimate of the Agent’s belief about the program mode 
(Mt; “Normal” or “Reversal”) and the Agent’s intention to donate to the charity, respectively, on 
trial t. λBel and λlnt are the Belief and Intent learning rates, respectively; MPEt and MOt are the 
Mode Prediction Error and Mode Outcome on trial t. IPEt and IOt are the Intent Prediction Error 
and Intent Outcome on trial t, and COt is the Choice Outcome.  
 
Table S1. Summary of demographic information and survey data. Related to Figures 2-4, 
Results, and STAR Methods.  
Shaded cells indicate measures that were used to match groups. Bold type and *’s indicate 
measures for which ASD data were significantly different (controlling for multiple comparisons) 
than control data. Note that there was a significant difference between ASD and CTL for the 
RMET task (p=0.007) but it did not survive Bonferroni correction. 
 
  
 
Table S2. Autism Diagnostic Observation Schedule scores. Related to Figures 2-4, and STAR 
Methods.  
Autism Diagnostic Observation Schedule (ADOS)[S2] scores (mean ± standard deviation) for the 
ASD participants. When available (n=24) ADOS-2[S3] scores are provided (both raw and 
calibrated severity scores[S4]). 
 
  
 Group 
Overall  Accuracy Learning: (AccuracyLast30 –AccuracyFirst30) 
Belief  Intent Choice Consistency Intent Choice  
CTL1 0.65 [0.60, 0.69] 
0.66 
[0.59, 0.73] 
0.57 
[0.55, 0.61] 
0.74 
[0.66, 0.81] 
0.14 
[0.07, 0.22] 
0.01 
[-0.04, 0.05] 
CTL2 0.66 [0.62, 0.71] 
0.61 
[0.54, 0.70] 
0.55 
[0.52, 0.59] 
0.76 
[0.69, 0.83] 
0.12 
[0.06, 0.20] 
0.01 
[-0.04, 0.09] 
ASD 0.59 [0.56, 0.63] 
0.56 
[<0.50, 0.63] 
0.51 
[0.49, 0.52] 
0.70 
[0.63, 0.76] 
0.02 
[-0.05, 0.08] 
0.00 
[-0.06, 0.06] 
 
Table S3. Mentalizer Task Behavioral Performance. Related to Figure 2, Task Performance 
Accuracy, and STAR Methods.  
Table of mentalizer task performance: Overall Accuracy for Belief, Intent, Choice, and 
Consistency, as well as Learning (change in mean accuracy from the first 30 to the last 30 trials) 
for Intent and Choice. Shaded boxes indicate those means for which bootstrapped 95% confidence 
intervals excluded chance accuracy (0.5) and chance learning (0.0) performance. As mentioned in 
the main text, CTL performance was above chance for all measures except Choice Learning, while 
ASD performance was specifically impaired for Intent and Choice Overall Accuracy, as well as 
Intent Learning (AccuracyLast30-AccuracyFirst30). This pattern of results was robust to the number 
of trials used to calculate learning (e.g. 20 or 40). Note: Baseline Intent performance (average of 
first 10 trials) did not differ from chance in any group.   
 
Table S4. Correlations between mentalizer task performance and ADOS symptom severity. 
Related to Figures 2, 3, and Analysis of Individual Differences. 
Correlation coefficients (Pearson’s r with 95% confidence intervals) describing the relationships 
between ADOS Severity Scores[S4] (Restricted and Repetitive Behaviors [RRB] and Social Affect 
[SA]) and task performance (overall accuracy for belief and consistency, change in accuracy for 
intent and choice, as well as belief and intent learning rates from model fitting). Shaded boxes 
indicate 95% confidence intervals that excluded zero. Only SA scores exhibited a significant 
relationship with task performance (Belief and Intent). 
  
  
 
Table S5. Correlations between mentalizer task behavioral performance and survey 
measures.  Related to Figure 2 and Analysis of Individual Differences.  
Correlation coefficients (Pearson’s r) describing the relationships between performance (overall 
accuracy for belief and consistency and change in accuracy for intent and choice) and other 
measures. For the purposes of these analyses, data were collapsed across groups. Both uncorrected 
(unc) and Bonferroni corrected (cor) 95% confidence intervals are presented in brackets under the 
Pearson’s r value. Bolded text indicates 95% confidence intervals that excluded zero, shaded boxes 
indicate those correlations for which corrected bootstrapped 95% confidence intervals excluded 
zero. 
  
Table S6. Correlations between mentalizer task model parameters and survey measures. 
Related to Figure 3 and Analysis of Individual Differences. 
Correlation coefficients (Pearson’s r) describing the relationships between estimated model 
parameters (belief and intent learning rate) from the individual-level fits and survey measures. 
Both uncorrected (unc) and Bonferroni corrected (cor) 95% confidence intervals are presented in 
brackets under the Pearson’s r value. Bolded text indicates 95% confidence intervals that excluded 
zero, shaded boxes indicate those correlations for which corrected bootstrapped 95% confidence 
intervals excluded zero. To ensure no bias in correlational analyses involving model parameters, 
all data from the mentalizer task (CTL1, CTL2, and ASD) were combined and fit with a single 
hierarchical model (using the a priori model M1).  Our reasoning was that, given that model 1 best 
describes control performance (and therefore putatively intact ToM processing), the extent to 
which it captures individual participant performance across all groups might correlate with other 
measures that have been used to assess autism-like traits and social ability in the literature. 
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